Captial Structure: Is there an optimal level?

Optimal capital structures are an interesting (and complicated) area of research.  Personally, I’m quite a fan of the traditional view.  At the risk of sounding like a grumpy old man; back in the day, people seemed to be more sensible.  What happened to the days of companies having a concern for their levels of debt?  Of course, debt is cheap but debt is also constant.  What the good times are here, having a cheap source of capital is great... but what about the bad times?

The traditional approach considered the idea that although debt was cheap, WACC would only decrease to a certain point, where the financial risk was considered to be too high, thus seeing WACC decrease as equity was used as a source of capital.  The optimal capital structure was seen as a delicate balancing act.  ‘Was’ being the key word...

It seems in current times, or at least before 2007, shareholders were content with the risk involved in taking on massive amounts of debt because of the returns they were seeing.  Satisfied that they were maximising shareholder wealth, companies were happy to take on more and more debt.  Then came the point when the ‘credit crunch’ sunk its teeth into a bloated and unsuspecting world.  Suddenly debt finance became impossible as banks collectively panicked over their enormous shortfalls from carelessly loaning out money to any person that could ‘walk and chew gum at the same time’.  Companies like PC World that based their short term cash flow forecasts under the assumption of acquiring cheap debt struggled for survival, and shareholder wealth was obliterated.  Oh for the good old days.

A reason for this blasé attitude appears to stem from the research of Modigliani & Millar (1958), who suggested there was no optimal capital structure, and company value is based on business risk.  The assumptions made in this study were rightfully torn apart by academics, who found the idea of assuming no tax to be laughable.  With nothing being ‘certain but death and taxes’, I’m inclined to agree with the academics.  After a rethink, which included tax, it was found that debt was a significantly cheaper source of capital which would lead to company value being improved if this emphasis on debt was used.

Of course, humans seem to crave an excuse to do something if they can justify it, thus the loading on of debt became almost commonplace.  After the deregulation, which stems from the 1980’s, banks took this opportunity to greater levels which has finally resulted in the chaos we see today.  Only after such a major failure has any action been taken to rectify this, with the introduction of Basel III as an attempt to rectify this problem. 

Personally, although you cannot deny the benefits of debt, the level we have allowed our businesses, governments and ourselves to become reliant on debt is ridiculous.  It is a damning assessment to look at our inability to be sensible and level headed.  As soon as the banks were deregulated, greed seemed to override common sense.  Is there an optimal capital structure?  Most definitely.  Are we anywhere near it?  Looking at the mess we’re in after our love affair with debt, probably not.  Oh for the good old days...

The Global Financial Crisis- A warning of things to come?

The start of my university life back in September 2007 coincided almost perfectly with the emergence of the dreaded credit crunch.  Walking down Northumberland Street to see countless people queuing outside of Northern Rock provided me with a great source of entertainment.  I saw it as a massive overreaction made by people that consider the scaremongering of the media to be gospel truth.  To an extent, I was correct; government policy protected the first £75,000 in a person’s bank account.  To actually learn the extent of the problems the economy faced on a global scale is quite terrifying, and utterly infuriating.

The level of confidence in the marketplace before the financial crisis was incredible.  The house market was booming, credit was cheap, and everything was rosy.  Collateralised debt obligations were a big source of this increased liquidity in the market, which promised a source of cash depending on the rating assigned by the credit rating agencies.  The rate of return in the AAA rated assets were so high, even banks were utilising these options.

Incredibly, these banks that were supplying long term mortgages were investing in assets that depended on the success of the mortgages they were issuing.  Confidence was so high in these assets, banks built up assets around these CDOs.  The problem arose when the house market began to decline, which saw the increase on defaults on mortgage payments.  All of a sudden, these ‘safe’ assets became far less secure. 

The cash shortages created a chain reaction that went on to cripple the banking sector, leading to panic amongst the public that their hard earned saving were at serious risk.  Suddenly cash became a rare commodity and successful businesses were finding it increasingly difficult to fund their operations as a result of this shortage.  The decision made by the UK government to offer a bailout option to the banks illustrates how severe the situation became, with the bailout dwarfing the annual cost of running the NHS.

The use of the word ‘confidence’ in this blog to describe the mood towards the marketplace is perhaps a poor choice.  Confidence implies a belief in the ability to succeed, yet the banks ability to succeed was so heavily hinged on the housing market and CDO’s, that the word ‘arrogance’ seems more appropriate.  The importance of planning, spreading risk and assuring cash is always available has been emphasised at every aspect of my business education.  How is it that bankers were so blind to this? 

The arrogance in assuming the bubble could never burst, that market value will continue to increase is beyond belief.  To not consider the possibility of a problem emerging in the future as a result of ‘putting all your eggs in one basket’ is madness.  To find a source of this particular financial crisis and focus on avoiding that particular mistake again is to miss to the point in my opinion however.

Maybe there will be greater regulation in future regarding the assumed security of investment assets, but in 10 years time, house prices will still demand staggering mortgages, banks will still take out loans to fund these mortgages and the world will run on the assumption that credit will be available to them to get by.

It is frustrating to think that we, the taxpayer are the victims in this financial crisis and I sincerely doubt we will ever get so much as a ‘thank you’ from Northern Rock or RBS.  It is scary to think that we appear to have applied a band aid to a broken leg in making no drastic changes to the regulations surrounding business.  Maybe we will learn from our mistakes and prosper from a more restrained credit system.  I worry however that we will continue to make the same fundamental mistakes in future.  Maybe the next time we see a credit crunch, the ramifications could be far more serious than public spending cuts and increases in tax.